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Abstract: The first essay discusses the aggregation bias issue in estimating the degree of 
market power for agricultural and food industries and explores ways to 
improve the conjectural elasticity estimates using proper aggregation 
procedures. Aggregation biases, caused by ignoring heterogeneity of micro 
agents, are derived mathematically, and proper procedures to reduce the 
aggregation biases are proposed by incorporating public micro level data in the 
empirical model with their distribution information. Conjectural elasticity is 
estimated with alternative cost functions for the sensitivity analysis. Overall, 
the degree of conjectural elasticities from newly developed empirical models 
tend to show more collusion state of market than those from traditional 
aggregated models. The conjectural elasticity from the distributional model and 
joint distribution model has closer value with conjectural elasticity from firm 
level data. 
 
                 The second paper examines the impact of captive market supply on spot 
market price in the U.S. cattle procurement market, while considering dynamic 
interactions between captive and spot markets.  Both conceptual analysis and 
empirical models explore advantages of dynamic models over static models by 
focusing on the temporal change in the ratio of captive purchase to packers’ 
total procurement and discount factor. Empirical models were estimated using 
the Kalman filter procedure with three alternative cost functions. Overall, 
dynamic estimation results found a negative relationship between captive 
market quantity and spot market prices. However, results of static model 
showed that the captive market quantity - spot market price relationship was 
sensitive to assumptions on captive supply and functional forms of cost 
function. Findings from our empirical analysis clearly suggest that dynamic 
models are more appropriate than static models in examining the impact of 
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      CHAPTER I 
 
 
ESTIMATING MARKET POWER EXERTION FOR AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD 
INDUSTRIES: AN ISSUE OF DATA AGGREGATION BIAS REDUCTION 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study discusses the aggregation bias issue in estimating the degree of market power for 
agricultural and food industries and explores ways to improve the conjectural elasticity estimates 
using proper aggregation procedures. Aggregation biases, caused by ignoring heterogeneity of 
micro agents, are derived mathematically, and proper procedures to reduce the aggregation biases 
are proposed by incorporating public micro level data in the empirical model with their 
distribution information. Conjectural elasticity is estimated with alternative cost functions for the 
sensitivity analysis. Overall, the degree of conjectural elasticities from newly developed empirical 
models tend to show more collusion state of market than those from traditional aggregated 
models. The conjectural elasticity from the distributional model and joint distribution model has 




As agricultural and food industries become increasingly integrated and concentrated, there have been 
numerous studies estimating the market power of these industries (e.g., Schroeter 1988; Azzam 1990, 
1991; Chung and Tostao 2009, 2012). New empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) models used in 
previous studies first derived conceptual models from profit-maximizing- theory of firm. The 
industry-level market power is represented by the market share weighted average of each firm's 
conjectural elasticity. Therefore, the estimation of firm-level conjectural elasticity is the first step to 
get market conduct parameter. However, available and affordable data are mainly aggregated, and it 
is difficult and expensive to obtain the firm-level data. The top four companies in the beef packing 
industry (CR4), which occupied 83% of commercial cattle slaughter in 2017, do not present their 
firms’ data. Therefore, the market power parameter is usually estimated by aggregated data such as 
industry or market level data. The individual firm’s behavior is difficult to estimate using aggregated 
data, and the interactions between the individual firms are also ignored in this situation. As a result, 
the market power parameter estimated using aggregated data can likely be overestimated or 
underestimated. 
The empirical estimation of market power is usually based on aggregate time-series data at either market 
or industry level, which does not consider the heterogeneity of individual firm behavior (e.g., Schroeter 1988; 
Azzam 1990, 1991; Lopez, Azzam and Carmen 2002; Zheng and Vukina 2008; Ji, Chung and Lee 2017). In 
such studies, assuming homogeneous firms, the representative producer model ignores the diverse 
dispersion of each firm’s market conduct parameter and assumes the same marginal cost and 
conjectural coefficient or elasticity. As a result, estimated market elasticities from some studies have 
insignificant or relatively small value (Schreoter 1998; Muth and Wohlgenant 1999; Morrison 2001).  
It is well known in empirical econometrics that when relations are derived from microeconomic 
theory, but are estimated by means of aggregated data, the aggregation can lead to biased parameter 
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estimates (Theil 1971; Maddala 1977; Stoker 1984, 1986, 1993). The applied econometrics literature 
indicates that ignoring heterogeneity in estimates of individual firm behavior (represented by 
conjectural coefficient or elasticity) may result in biased estimation of the overall market power of 
U.S. beef processors. Specifically, the most studies of market power are based on aggregated data, 
U.S. or state level (Table 1.1) data. Only a few studies’ market power measurements are estimated 
with plant level data (Driscoll, Kambhampaty, and Purcell 1997; Morrison 2001; Crespi and Sexton 
2005). As a result, the firm’s heterogeneity is ignored and market power estimates are likely to be 
biased because unbiased estimation of market power highly depends on accurate estimation of 
marginal cost. This aggregation issue is highlighted in the literature of  NEIO approach, for example, 
in Schroeter and Azzam (1990), Raper, Love and Shumway (2000), Morrison (2001).Standard errors 
of coefficients from  aggregated data  and individual firm-level data tend to be different , which can 
make different policy implication from statistical inference (Garrett 2003). . Therefore, the issue of 
aggregation bias raises concerns regarding the validity of market power estimated from aggregated 
data and highlights the need for research designed to enhance our understanding of aggregation bias 




This study first discusses statistical processes to estimate the degree of aggregation bias and find 
which types of aggregation biases can likely happen. The aggregation bias consists of two 
components:  the bias from covariance between variables and corresponding parameters and the 
bias caused by the use of improper aggregated data. If the covariance between variables and 
corresponding parameters is nonzero, which means all agents are heterogeneous, the covariance 
cannot be ignored. However, the “representative producer model” assumes all identical 
producers, which leads to the same conjectural elasticity and marginal cost for all producers. 
Therefore, this unreasonable assumption causes the aggregation bias. A typical method for 
making aggregate data is arithmetic mean, and this type of data is widely accepted to estimate 
econometric models. However, proper aggregate data for some equations, such as log equations, 
are not arithmetic mean but geometric mean. If researchers use arithmetic mean instead of 
geometric mean to aggregate log equations, then the estimated parameter should be biased.       
Second,   this study proposes new procedures to eliminate or at least reduce aggregation 
bias when estimating market power. Our first approach is to eliminate aggregation bias by using 
proper procedures for data aggregation. For example, the trans-log cost function includes the log 
value of each firm’s production, and the logarithm of firm output can be transformed to a 
dispersion ratio by proper aggregation. Theil (1971) defines this procedure as an entropy measure 
of relative inequality. Similarly, trans-log consumer demand function has each individual’s 
income term, and aggregated income has identical form of Theil’s entropy measure (Berndt 1977; 
Deaton 1980a, 1980b; Lewbel 1992; Albuquerque 2003). Secondly, combining aggregate data 
and published firm-level data can reduce the aggregation bias.  When one does not have firm-
level data, but have only approximate information, such as average, variance, and distribution, 
she can combine the aggregate data with the additional information about the data. The third 
approach is a joint distribution approach with dummy variables. The individual marginal cost 
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function has dummy variables indicating heterogeneity. The aggregation of dummy changed to 
proportion of corresponding firms respect to total firms (Stoker 1993).  
The next section provides review of previous studies about aggregation bias. The 
methodology section shows the limitation of traditional conjectural elasticity based on  data and 
introduces new approaches, hybrid models, to eliminate the aggregation bias. The data section 
discusses  the data generation procedure of firm level data using the Monte Carlo technique. 360 
monthly observation with one thousand firm level data are generated based on the true market 
power data. Then, estimation results from the macro model, aggregated model and hybrid model 





Appelbaum (1982) introduces a NEIO framework to estimate market power using a set of firm’s 
input demand function and price-margin equation derived from a firm’s profit function. This 
approach is applied to the U.S. beef packing industry to measure market power, and previous 
studies find statistically significant estimates of market power (Azzam and Pagoulatos 1990; 
Schreoter and Azzam 1990; Azzam 1992, Azzam and Park 1993, Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson 
1993, Stiegert, Azzam, and Brorsen 1993). However, some of NEIO studies do not find evidence 
to support the existence of market power as Table 1 (Muth and Wohlgenant 1999; Schroeter, 
Azzam, and Zhang 2000; Paul 2001). Most previous studies of market power estimates are based on 
aggregate data, such as at the U.S. or state level, due to lack of available firm level data. The 
measurement of market power with aggregate data assumes that all firms are homogeneous. This 
assumption makes the biased estimation of marginal cost, and the market power estimates are 
biased or insignificant (Schroeter and Azzam 1990). The aggregate data issue is a serious cause of 
biased estimation in previous studies using NEIO, but to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
work that shows how to reduce or eliminate the aggregation bias in estimating the NEIO models.  
Many studies have shown that ignoring the heterogeneity causes biased estimators and 
introduced various methods to address the heterogeneity issue, particularly in estimating aggregated 
demand function (Theil 1971, Jorgensen, Lau and Stoker 1982, Stoker 1993, 2005). “Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS)” uses an aggregated demand function with a distributional term, which is 
composed of entropy statistics (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980). Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) was 
extended to estimate aggregation bias in linear and quadratic AIDS (QUAIDS) models (Blundell et 
al 1993a, b; Mittelhammer, Shi and Wahl 1996; Denton and Mountain 2001, 2004; Matsuda 2006). 
The QUAIDS models were further extended to alternative functional forms such as log-linear and 
quadratic functions (Lewbel 1992; Garderen, Lee and Pesaran 2000; Albuquerque 2003;  Moeltner 
2003; Tenn 2006). Jorgensen, Lau and Stoker (1982) also extended Deaton and Muellbauer 
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(1980)’s study by incorporating dummy variables indicating categories of micro data values. These 
dummy variables can indicate various information of demographic distribution data, and this 
approach can reduce aggregation bias efficiently by addressing heterogeneity of micro agents. 
Denton and Mountain (2011, 2016) compare demand elasticities from micro data, aggregated level 
data, and aggregated data with the income distribution model. Our study extends Denton and 
Mountain (2011, 2016) by decomposing the aggregation biases mathematically to show causes of 
aggregation biases. 
 The usual panel estimation by the fixed or random effect model assumes that coefficients 
are homogeneous, and this assumption can cause the aggregation bias by ignoring the heterogeneity 
of coefficients. However, individual heterogeneity can be addressed using the random coefficient 
model (RCM) for panel analysis. Therefore, the aggregation bias can be found by comparing 
coefficients based on RCM with coefficients based on the fixed or random effect model. Nickell 
(1981) shows that panel analysis with the fixed or random effect model with aggregated data 
estimation are not consistent in a dynamic model or a time series model due to ignoring coefficient 
heterogeneity. Pesaran and Smith (1995), Biørn and Skjerpen (2004), Imbs, Mumtaz, Ravn, and 











Traditional NEIO Estimation 
Let’s assume that each packer’s output market is competitive, but raw material-input market is 
not competitive, in other words, an oligopsony market. The profit function of ith packer is: 








,is industry level output ,  where yi is raw material input and final output at firm-
level by assuming the fixed proportion technology, P is output price, w is raw material input 
price, Ci is a function of processing cost, v is vector of input price except raw material input. 
Equation (1) is written by profit maximization for firm i as: 
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 is marginal processing cost of ith firm. 
The ith firm’s trans-log cost function is given by: 
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where βnm=βmn, MLKmn ,,,  , which means capital, labor and intermediate input, wk, wl, wm 
are price of capital, labor and intermediate input. 
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The input demand function can be derived by Shephard’s lemma, which means the derivative of 
the cost function of equation (3) with respect to the input price, wK, wL, wM. The capital, labor and 











































s  ,, and are capital, labor and intermediate cost-
share equation, 
MiMiLiLiKiKii xwxwxwc  is total cost of firm i. 
The output demand function is given as 
(6) )/ln()/(lnln SqSpay     
where η is demand elasticity, ρ is income elasticity, q is GNP, and S is GNP deflator. 
The ith firm’s conjectural elasticity can be estimated by the simultaneous equation model 
consisting of equation (4) and (5). The estimated conjectural elasticity means the packer’s degree 
of oligopsony in the fed cattle market. If the 0i , then the fed cattle market is a perfect 
competitive market. If the 1i , then the fed cattle market is a monopsony market.  
Aggregation Bias Issue in NEIO Models 
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The industry level marginal processing cost is the summation of each firm’s marginal processing 
cost. However, packer (firm) level data for equation (4) are not available or difficult to obtain. 
Therefore, researchers usually estimate the conjectural elasticity with aggregated data, such as 
industry level data (Appelbaum 1982, Schroeter 1988, Azzam 1997). This approach has critical 
limitations that all packers have the same conjectural elasticity and also have identical marginal 
processing cost ( ji   , ji mcmcmc  ). The beef packing industry is capital intensive, and 
is one of the economy of scale industries. The top 5 (Tyson, JBS USA, Cargill, National, and 
American Foods Group)  packers have 77.9% of total commercial cattle and hog slaughter in 2014. 
These major packers’ production quantity is different with the rest of packers and their marginal costs 
are also different to small size packers. Therefore, the conjectural elasticity based on aggregated data 
is likely to be biased.  
The industry level of equation (4) becomes the following equation under the assumption that all 





ˆ    
where ̂  is industry level conjectural elasticity, WK, WL, and WM is industry level data of capital, 
labor and intermediate input, Y is industry output,  
The industrial conjectural elasticity is defined as the market share weighted average of firm’s 








   
where  is industrial conjectural elasticity, si is market share of ith firm, Yys ii  . 
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The conjectural elasticity of the industry level can be obtained by multiplying market share (si) to 













Equation (9) shows that margin (left side of equation 9) is the sum of the first term of right side 
of equation (9), which means market power, and the second term of right side of equation (9), 
which means marginal processing cost weighted by market share. The difference is clear by 
comparing equation (7) and (9). The variables in equation (7) are macro (industrial) level 
variables without proper aggregation processes. This equation system is considered as the macro 
model in this analysis, On the other hand, equation (9) is considered as the aggregated model. 
The macro model assumes that each firm has identical conjectural elasticities and the same 
marginal costs as mentioned before. If we estimate equation (7) instead of (9), then the 
conjectural elasticity and parameter estimates will be biased. Equation (9) can be written by the 
following equation with relation to arithmetic, geometric means, and the covariance definition. 
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Lw  and 
g
Mw  is geometric mean of Kiw , Liw , and Miw . 
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Equation (10) is the properly aggregated model and shows the difference, especially the 
covariance terms and square term, with the macro equation (7).  
If researchers estimate the macro model instead of the aggregated model, the estimated 
parameters will be biased due to specification error. If the covariance terms and second order 
approximation terms of equation (9) are zero, the aggregation bias will vanish. Theil (1971) 
showed that covariance terms are generated by the heterogeneity of individual firms. If the firms 
have homogeneous marginal cost and input demand quantity, then the aggregation bias formed by 
cross section heterogeneity will vanish. The difference between arithmetic mean and geometric 
mean generates the last line of equation (10). If Kiw , Liw , Miw and iy , have the same value 
across the cross section, then the arithmetic mean and geometric mean are identical and these 
second order approximation terms in the last line will disappear. If all of the firm’s data are 
identical across the cross section, then the aggregated model equation (10) will be the same with 
the macro model equation (7). However, this assumption cannot be accepted in the real world. 
Each firm has different technologies, capital, and marketing conditions. In addition, most 
aggregated data are not generated by geometric mean, but by arithmetic means of micro variables. 
And geometric mean has different values with arithmetic means unless all valuables are identical. 
So if researchers estimate equation (7) instead of equation (10), then the omitted terms will be 
submerged to error term and make biased parameters.  
Equation (10) is written as the following equation to show matrix form. 
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The error term (  ) of equation (11) consists of covariance and square term of approximation 
and these properties do not meet the basic assumption that the mean of error term is zero. This 
non zero mean of error term is generated by aggregation bias, and this bias can be drawn as the 
following equation. The detailed derivation process is in appendix B. 
(12)            XXXXXXXXXXXYXXXb   1111  
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Expectation value of equation (12) is  
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The second term on the right side of equation (13) is aggregation bias due to ignoring the 
parameter heterogeneity, the third term is aggregation bias originated from ignoring individual 
firm’s cost, and the last term is the aggregation bias produced by using linearly aggregated data 
for the nonlinear macro model. If the parameter of each firm is identical, then the second term 
will disappear, and if each firm’s cost is the same, then the third term also will vanish. These 
components of aggregation bias can be estimated by the following process. 
Equation (13) can be changed to scalar form and the conjectural elasticity term as 



























































The first term on the right side of equation (14) is the mean of conjectural elasticity, and the 
second term is derived from the heterogeneity of each firm’s conjectural elasticity. The other 
terms including nmihp  on the first line are aggregation bias due to heterogeneity of each micro 
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parameter, and the term including nmihc  in parenthesis on the second line is formed by 
aggregation bias by ignoring the heterogeneity of each firm’s cost. The last term ir1 , is 
aggregation bias generated by improper data aggregation (arithmetic means instead of geometric 
means). The elements of matrixes HPi and HCi can be derived from the definition of each matrix 
and the elements can be estimated as auxiliary following equations. The other auxiliary equations 














Elimination of Aggregation Bias 
The aggregation biases are generated when the macro data model was estimated without proper 
data aggregation process. So the best approach to avoid aggregation bias is estimation using 
micro level data only. However, it is difficult to obtain the whole micro level data for estimation 
as mentioned before, and in this case, researchers need to replace absent micro level data with 
available aggregated data. There are several methods to reduce the aggregation bias by 
incorporating micro data into the macro model and these models are considered as hybrid models. 
For this approach, we need at least one kind of micro (firm) level data to insert in the macro 
model and assume that beef packers have not presented their input cost, such as capital, labor and 
intermediate input cost data, but showed their beef production data or production capacity. The 
hybrid models are distributional approach with specific micro data, distributional approach 
without specific data, and joint distribution approach with dummy variables. In addition, other 




     A. Distributional Approach with Firm’s Production Data 
Berndt, Darrough and Diewart (1977) introduced direct methods of distributional information into 
aggregated trans-log demands equations. Deaton and Muellbauer’s (1980a, 1980b) showed this 
approach in their popular “Almost Ideal Demand System” or AIDS to aggregate each individual’s 
budget share. 
 Let’s assume that researchers have firm level beef production data and macro data of marginal 
processing costs, which means
ji yy  , xjxi ww   for x = K, L, M, i ≠ j. Then equation (4) can be 
changed as 
(16) 










The conjectural elasticity of industry level (Θ) is written as 
(17) 
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Equation (17) is written as 
(18) 
























where  y is density function of y. 
Equation (18) can be simplified as 
(19)   iyiyiMyMLyLKyKyi yEWWW
y
c
wwP log2logloglog    
The last term of equation (19) in parenthesis,  iyE log  can be changed as  
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As we set all firms share same aggregated data, this means that all firm’s marginal input cost is 
the same. So the covariance term of equation (l0) has vanished and geometric mean and 
arithmetic means have the same value for the same reason. As a result, equation (19) is a hybrid 
form between equation (7) and (10). 
     B. Distribution Approach without Specific Production Information 
In this paper, we have generated production data of each firm and can get the average of 
production, E(yi). However, firm level data are usually unavailable, and each firm’s specific 
production data is more difficult to obtain. In this case, we can get an average value of production 
approximately based on presented production distribution. Let's suppose that we only have the 
partial information about each firm’s production data based on previous research and presented 
data. Then we assume that the production of each firm is Gamma distribution as  ~ ,1iy   , 
then the price-margin equation contains the marginal cost function of trans-log form, so equation 
(19) is changed as 
(21)      log log log 2 lnyi yK K yL L yM M yy
c
P w w W W W k
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         
where ty ,       lnlog ityE ,  k  is digamma function.  
 
C. Joint Distributional Approach 
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where Asi is a dummy variable indicating production quantity categories of firm i, s=1,2,…,S, As  
is the parameter of each dummy variable.  
Equation (22) can be aggregated the same way as equation (19) as 
(23)  
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The above equation (24) is a proportion of total production accounted for by firms with Ast=l. 
So equation (23) has a size distribution of production of each firm E(log yi) and heterogeneity 
effect of the production proportion of the firms. 
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D. Application to Another Cost Function Form 
The Trans-log cost function is estimated for the conjectural elasticity as mentioned above. 
However, many previous studies point out that functional forms affect the estimation of 
conjectural elasticity (Azzam and Pagoulatos, 1991; Sexton, 2000). The other form of cost 
function is considered for a sensitivity analysis of conjectural elasticity estimation. The included 
cost function forms are Generalized Leontief and Quadratic functions. 
 
D-1. Generalized Leontief Cost Function 
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where n, m=K, L and M. 
Equation (2) with marginal cost function of equation (25) is written as 
(26)  MiMiLiLiKiKiiMiMMiLiLLiKiKKii wwwywwwwwP   2  






222 MiLiLMiMiKiKMiLiKiKLi wwwwww    
The assumption that jiMLKxforww xjxi  ,,, and beef production data of each firms, 
yi is micro level data, then the aggregated form of equation (26) by distributional approach is  
(27)   MMMLLLKKKMMLLKK wwwwwwHHIywwP   2   
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The HHI can be changed following the equation if we do not know the exact value of HHI, but we 
have only distribution of yi. If the production of each firm is Gamma distribution as,   1,~ ity , 
then the price-margin equation contains marginal cost function of trans-log form, equation (27) is as 
(28)  
1
2 K K L L M M KK K LL L MM MP w w y w w w w w w
n

      

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where n is the observation number. 
The aggregated form of equation (26) by joint distributional with dummy variable approach is  
(29)    MMMLLLKKKMMLLKK wwwwwwHHIywwP   2   
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D-2 Normalized Quadratic Cost Function 
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where n, m = K, L, M. 
Equation (2) with marginal cost function of equation (30) is written as 
(31) 
MiMyiLiLyiKiKyiiyyiyii wwwywwP    
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If we assume that , , ,ni njw w for n K L M i j   and beef production data of each firms, yi 
is firm level data, then the aggregated form of equation (31) by distributional approach is  
(32) 
MMyLLyKKyyyy wwwHHIywwP    
The expectation value of ty , ty ,       lnlog ityE ,  k  is digamma 
function when production of each firm is Gamma distribution as,   1,~ ity . Then equation 
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The data sets were collected from the Economic Research Service (ERS) of the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA/ERS), Grain Inspection, Packer and Stockyards 
Administration (USDA/GIPSA), and the National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA/NASS). 
Steer and heifer slaughter quantity is used proxy of beef production from Livestock Slaughter 
Annual Summary of National Agricultural Statistics Service, United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA). Cattle slaughter quantity is from NASS of USDA, Capital, labor and 
material input price of the beef packing industry is from Industry Productivity and Costs Database 
of Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), United States Department of Labor (USDL). Beef price is 
from the ERS of the USDA and income is Per Capita GDP. Retail output is total U.S. commercial 
beef production from red meat year book of ERS, USDA. The retail sales data is from 
progressive Grocer magazine, beef retail price is from ERS, USDA. The detailed statistics of data 
are presented in Table 1-2. 
Some firm’ slaughter and capacity data are obtained from Cattle Buyers Weekly (CBW). 
However, the other firm level data are rarely available in the real world; therefore, the Monte Carlo 
technique is used to generate the firm level data. One thousand firm level data with 360 monthly 
observations (from January 1980 to December 2009) are generated based on the true market power 
parameter. The data generating process is as follows. First, the theoretical model is derived from 
processor’s profit maximization equation. Second, the parameters of each equation from (5) to (9) are 
estimated using the collected data set. Then the estimated parameter is used as a starting value and the 
variance-covariance matrix is obtained. These estimated parameters and variance–covariance matrix 
analyzed in this process are given in the Appendix D.  Third, Cholesky decomposition is applied variance-
covariance matrix to obtain random error. Fourth, generated multivariate error terms are added to each 
equation for stochastic simulation of endogenous variables. Finally, each firm level data are generated by a 




The estimation system has five simultaneous equations ( Ks , Ls , Ms , log yi, price-margin equation) 
and are estimated using the  General Moment Methods (GMM) procedure. The instrumental 
variables approach is used due to endogeneity of some variables. The instrumental variables are 
HHI for cattle slaughter, CR4, steer and heifer price and quantity of Nevada, Texas, cattle on feed, 
cattle placement, cattle on marketing, pork and chicken price, and income. The price elasticity of 
raw material input is assumed at 0.45 (Brester and Wohlgenant 1993) for simplicity.  
Table 1.3 shows the estimation results of conjectural elasticity based on firm level data, E(Θ), 
simple average value of each firm’s conjectural elasticity and aggregation bias.  The simple 
average value of each firm’s conjectural elasticity is 0.1461 and aggregation bias is -0.0096. The 
aggregation bias consists of three terms originated from the heterogeneity of parameters, 
heterogeneity of cost, and linearly aggregated data for the nonlinear aggregated model. The 
aggregation bias from the heterogeneity of parameters is 0.0668 and from heterogeneity of cost is 
0.0043. The aggregation bias due to linearly aggregated data for the nonlinear aggregated model 
is -0.0807 and shows the largest absolute value of bias. Sum of aggregation bias, -0.0096, looks 
to be a small value, however, its absolute value is not a small value compared to the average of 
micro conjectural elasticity. Therefore, if the proper aggregation methods are not considered, the 
estimation results are likely to be biased. 
Table 1.4 presents the estimation result of each model. The conjectural elasticity based on firm 
level data (Θ) with trans-log cost function form is 0.1712, and the conjectural elasticity based on 
aggregated data (̂ ) is 0.1464 and is significant at 1% level. The conjectural elasticity from 
aggregated data shows less value than the conjectural elasticity (Θ) from firm level data. All 
conjectural elasticities from the distribution models are larger values than the conjectural 
elasticity from aggregated model (̂ ). Specifically, conjectural elasticity of entropy approach and 
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Gamma distribution model is 0.1548, 0.1595 and is significant at 1% level. Conjectural elasticity of 
joint distribution approach is 0.1492. The conjectural elasticity from aggregated data shows less value 
than the conjectural elasticity of firm level data, and this means that conjectural elasticity from 
aggregated level is likely to underestimate the conjectural elasticity and is biased estimate can supply 
policy maker’s with improper implications. However, the conjectural elasticity from distribution 
approach shows a closer value to the conjectural elasticity of firm level data because the aggregation 
bias is controlled in the model. The other parameter estimates of each model is suggested at Table 1.5. 
The conjectural elasticity based on firm level data (Θ) with generalized Leontief form is 
0.1536, and the conjectural elasticity based on aggregated data (̂ ) is 0.1099 in Table 1.4. The 
conjectural elasticity from aggregated data also shows less value than conjectural elasticity (Θ) 
from firm level data as trans-log cost function approach. The conjectural elasticity of entropy 
approach and Gamma distribution model is 0.1008 and 0.1147, and the conjectural elasticity of 
joint distribution approach is 0.1119. The conjectural elasticity of Gamma distribution and joint 
distribution approach show larger value than the aggregated model. The conjectural elasticity 
from aggregated data shows less value than conjectural elasticity of firm level data as seen in the 
previous case. The other parameter estimates of each model is suggested at Table 1.6. 
The conjectural elasticity based on firm level data (Θ) with normalized quadratic form is 
0.1679, and the conjectural elasticity based on aggregated data (̂ ) is 0.0633 in Table 1.4. The 
conjectural elasticity from aggregated data also shows less value than the conjectural elasticity 
(Θ) from firm level data as seen in previous approaches. The conjectural elasticity of entropy 
approach and log normal distribution model is 0.0656 and 0.0656, and the conjectural elasticity of 
joint distribution approach as 0.0658. The conjectural elasticities from distributional approach 
and joint distribution approach exist between aggregated model and firm level model. The other 




The conjectural elasticity is usually estimated using aggregated level data due to the lack of data 
availability, and therefore, conjectural elasticity of industrial level is estimated under assumptions 
that all firms have the same conjectural elasticity and identical marginal cost. In this case, the 
conjectural elasticity estimates are typically biased by ignoring heterogeneity of individual firms. 
This paper demonstrates how one can improve the conjectural elasticity estimation using 
proper aggregation processes. First, we showed mathematically that the estimation results from 
aggregated data were not identical to those from firm level data unless all firms have identical 
(homogeneous) cost function, market share, and conjectural elasticity. Then we derived a few 
approaches that can reduce the aggregation bias by incorporating public micro level data in the 
empirical model.  
To show validation of our distribution model, the firm level data is generated using 
Monte Carlo techniques and obtain each firm’s conjectural elasticity. The distribution model and 
joint distribution model are introduced to reduce aggregation bias for estimation conjectural 
elasticity. The distribution approach incorporates the public micro data term into the aggregated 
model, and this term has the distribution information.  
The joint distribution model has dummy variables indicating the category of the micro 
data, and this term can have distribution information by aggregation process. In addition, the 
conjectural elasticity can be different based on the cost function type. We test three different 
types of cost function (Trans-log, Generalized Leontief and Quadratic cost function). The results 
show that conjectural elasticity based on firm level data shows different values with conjectural 
elasticity based on firm level data, and so do other types of cost functions. The conjectural 
elasticity from the distribution model and joint distribution model show closer value with 
conjectural elasticity from firm level data.  
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The data availability is an important issue to researchers. The conjectural elasticity based 
on firm level data explain the degree of market power. However, the micro level data is not 
available and difficult to obtain. In this case, the distribution model shows better conjectural 
elasticity estimates than aggregated level data analysis alone. 
The limitation of this study is availability of firm level data. The distribution model can 
improve the estimation of conjectural elasticity but still needs small portions of firm level data to 
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Table 1.1. Literature on Market Power in Cattle Procurement 








1 Schroeter(1988) Annual 1951-83 U.S. beef packing N 
2 Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990) Annual 1959-82 U.S. 
Meat Packing 
(Beef and Pork) 
Y 
3 Schreoter and Azzam (1990) Quarterly  1976-86 U.S. 
Meat Packing 
(Beef and Pork) 
Y 
4 Azzam (1992) Monthly 1988-91 U.S. beef packing Y 
5 Azzam and Park (1993) Annual 
1960-77 
1982-87 













Y(but lower than 80-82) 
7 
Stiegert, Azzam, and Brorsen 
(1993) 
Quarterly  1972-86 U.S. beef packing Y 
8 





beef packing N 
9 Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) Annual 1967-93 U.S. beef packing N 
10 
Schroeter, Azzam,and Zhang 
(2000) 
Monthly 1990-94 U.S. beef wholesale 
N  (Little evidence of oligopolistic 
behavior by meatpacking firms) 
11 Paul (2001) monthly 1992-93 5 Regions  beef packing N 
12 Lopez, Azzam and Liron (2002) Annual 1972-92 U.S. 
Meat Packing 
(Beef and Pork) 
Y 






beef packing Y 
Notes: ‘Y‘means evidence of market power and ‘N‘means little to no evidence of buyer market power.  
            This tables is from Ward(2002) and Crespi, Xia, & Jones(2010).
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Table 1.2. Summary Statistics of Data 
 Mean S.D. Median Maximum Minimum 
Herfindahl Hirschman index for  
steer and heifer slaughter 
0.1606 0.0464 0.1777 0.2096 0.0561 
Beef Production (bil. lbs) 2.0397 0.1828 2.0368 2.512 1.653 
Cattle Slaughter live weight 
(bil. lbs) 
2.7266 0.2222 2.7204 3.3188 2.2275 
National Steers and Heifer  
Slughter (bil. lbs) 
2.6673 0.2852 2.6544 3.329 2.042 
Beef Retail Price ($/cwt) 119.74 15.82 118.83 156.41 92.23 
Calves Price ($/cwt) 88.7 14.24 89.33 127.51 43.89 
Beef Gross Farm Value ($/cwt) 69.23 1.2698 69.21 73.8 62.84 
Wholesale price ($/cwt) 80.05 3.3012 79.21 92.31 73.93 
Chicken Price ($/cwt) 162.16 17.53 164.4 213.64 123 
Pork Price ($/cwt) 251.78 18.06 252.5 308.96 220.77 
Corn Price ($/bushel) 2.2662 0.4155 2.247 3.3933 1.4851 
Sorghum Price ($/bushel) 2.1098 0.4226 2.072 3.5076 1.2125 
Gas Price ($/gal) 1.3659 0.3622 1.2222 2.8008 0.8941 
Capital Price (2000=100) 78.37 20.53 76.92 111.85 45.92 
Labor Price (2000=100) 88.88 27.14 85.41 138.92 44.26 
Material Price (2000=100) 100.83 21.26 100.24 159.97 70.5 
Capital Productivity (2000=100) 102.25 1.7342 102.4 105.62 99.58 
Labor Productivity (2000=100) 97.04 8.1391 97.61 112.85 83.57 





Table 1.3. Aggregation Bias of Conjectural Elasticity 
Details Estimates 
Total of estimated conjectural elasticity,  E  0.1557 
Average of micro conjectural elasticity,   0.1461 




From heterogeneity of parameter 0.0668 
From heterogeneity of cost 0.0043 
From linearly aggregated data for the nonlinear aggregated model -0.0807 
Sum of Aggregation Bias -0.0096 




Table 1.4. Summary of Conjectural Elasticity of Each Model 
 
Aggregated 
 model (̂ ) 












0.1464*** 0.1548*** 0.1595*** 0.1492*** 0.1712 
(0.0075) (0.0085) (0.0068) (0.0089) (97.6) 
GL 
 
0.1099*** 0.1008*** 0.1147*** 0.1119*** 0.1536 
(0.0021) (0.0039) (0.0026) (0.0349) (100.0) 
NQ 0.0633*** 0.0656*** 0.0656*** 0.0658*** 0.1679 
 (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0174) (44.7) 
1. Number in parentheses is standard error. 
2. Number in parentheses of firm level model is percentage of model that conjectural elasticity 
is statistically significant at 5% level.  
3. TL, GL, and NQ represent transcendental logarithmic, generalized Leontief, and normalized 




























βK -5.5092*** 0.2049  -5.1923*** 0.1891  -5.8439*** 0.2077  -5.3464*** 0.1949  
βL 3.8037*** 0.1570  3.6278*** 0.1481  2.4671*** 0.1273  3.5429*** 0.1444  
βM -2.5334*** 0.0888  -2.8944*** 0.0966  -2.1516*** 0.0785  -2.3085*** 0.0831  
βY -5.2412 4.1070  9.0548* 4.4112  4.8772 12.7132  25.4635 
36.309
6  
βKK -1.0853*** 0.2263  -1.0052*** 0.2117  -1.0849*** 0.1999  -1.0398*** 0.2138  
βLL -0.8811*** 0.1661  -0.8696*** 0.1647  -0.8066*** 0.1346  -0.8249*** 0.1523  
βMM 0.1966*** 0.0659  0.2094*** 0.0696  0.1916*** 0.0493  0.2052*** 0.0588  
βKL 1.1371*** 0.1886  1.1040*** 0.1821  1.0602*** 0.1552  1.0828*** 0.1747  
βKM -0.5532*** 0.0740  -0.5808*** 0.0782  -0.4687*** 0.0548  -0.5239*** 0.0683  
βLM 0.1530* 0.0703  0.1636* 0.0739  0.0933* 0.0524  0.1267* 0.0636  
βYK 4.2836*** 0.1353  4.055*** 0.1239  4.5181*** 0.1356  4.1573*** 0.1269  
βYL -2.5384*** 0.1057  -2.4097*** 0.0993  -1.52*** 0.0848  -2.3403*** 0.0962  
βYM 2.2004*** 0.0601  2.4718*** 0.0652  1.9146*** 0.0534  2.0294*** 0.0561  
βYY 2.3065 1.4981  4.7329* 2.4953  0.1054 0.2642  4.3067 2.8616  
θ 0.1464*** 0.0075  0.1548*** 0.0085  0.1595*** 0.0068  0.1492*** 0.0089  
βAS             -0.0653 0.1315  



























βK 0.1204*** 0.0125  0.0007*** 0.0002  0.0857*** 0.0107  0.0007*** 0.0002  
βL 0.0471*** 0.0049  -0.0006*** 0.0001  0.0749*** 0.0083  -0.0006*** 0.0001  
βM 0.1149*** 0.0114  -0.0001 0.0001  0.1179*** 0.0121  0.0000 0.0001  
βKK 4.2361*** 0.4476  6.3276*** 0.5754  5.1440*** 0.5778  6.6753*** 0.5979  
βLL 1.2851*** 0.0909  3.4829*** 0.3027  2.0516*** 0.1639  3.627*** 0.3133  
βMM 1.5662*** 0.1223  3.5415*** 0.2224  1.7241*** 0.1350  3.5155*** 0.2175  
βKL -0.8485*** 0.0922  -1.2852*** 0.1416  -1.2088*** 0.1349  -1.4125*** 0.1506  
βKM -1.0668*** 0.1085  -1.3351*** 0.1506  -1.0601*** 0.1297  -1.3689*** 0.1550  
βLM 0.3774*** 0.0443  -0.152* 0.0693  0.2873*** 0.0578  -0.1059 0.0720  
θ 0.1099*** 0.0021  0.1008*** 0.0039  0.1147*** 0.0026  0.1119*** 0.0349  
βAS             -25.0773 71.8288  


























βK 0.9815*** 0.0785  0.9775*** 0.0796  0.9775*** 0.0796  0.987*** 0.0757  
βL 2.6213*** 0.0893  2.6222*** 0.0894  2.6222*** 0.0894  2.6212*** 0.0893  
βM 3.5233*** 0.1601  3.5262*** 0.1609  3.5262*** 0.1609  3.5107*** 0.1549  
βKK 0.8941*** 0.1183  0.8925*** 0.1185  0.8925*** 0.1185  0.8874*** 0.1246  
βLL -0.0315 0.0787  -0.0305 0.0789  -0.0305 0.0789  -0.0282 0.0811  
βMM 0.0198 0.1214  0.0173 0.1217  0.0173 0.1217  0.0200 0.1241  
βKL 0.0533 0.0648  0.0529 0.0649  0.0529 0.0649  0.0501 0.0668  
βKM -0.0715 0.1060  -0.0685 0.1066  -0.0685 0.1066  -0.0635 0.1124  
βLM -0.1057 0.0695  -0.1078 0.0698  -0.1078 0.0698  -0.1039 0.0705  
βY -7.6602*** 2.1963  -7.8503*** 2.2500  -7.8503*** 2.2500  -7.851*** 2.9970  
βYY 0.0558*** 0.0170  0.0000*** 0.0000  0.0578*** 0.0181  0.0000*** 0.0000  
βYK 0.0514*** 0.0131  0.052*** 0.0134  0.0520*** 0.0134  0.0501*** 0.0129  
βYL 0.0186* 0.0095  0.0187* 0.0095  0.0187* 0.0095  0.0185* 0.0094  
βYM -0.004 0.0171  -0.0042 0.0172  -0.0042 0.0172  -0.0021 0.0159  
θ 0.0633*** 0.0143  0.0656*** 0.0147  0.0656*** 0.0147  0.0658*** 0.0174  
βAS             -0.3449 8.6005  



















APPENDIX A: Derivation of Equation (10) 
 
The first term of right side equation (9) is  



































































The first term of above equation (A-2) is  












The second term of equation (A-2) is 1 











                                                          
1 COV(XY, Z)=E(XYZ)-E(XY)E(Z) = E(XYZ)-E(Z){COV(X,Y)+E(X)E(Y)} 
                 =E(XYZ)-E(Z)COV(X,Y)-E(X)E(Y)E(Z) 




As the same way,  


































The equation (9) with (A-1) and (A-3) to (A-7) can be written as 
(A-8)      gyygMyMgLyLgKyKyii ywww
y
cn
snwwP loglogloglog,cov    
        iyiyiMiyMiLiyLiKiyKi ywww
y
cn
log,covlog,covlog,covlog,cov    
  )log,cov()log,cov()log,cov()log,cov(,cov iyiyiiMiyMiiLiyLiiKiyKiiyii ycwcwcwcc
y
n
   
The second term of first line can be derived as2 
                                                          
2 Let’s assume that    
(a) 
ii xln .  
Then we can write  
(b) gxln . where x is arithmetic mean and 
gx is geometric mean. 
































(A-9)   gyygMyMgMyLgMyKy ywww
y
cn
loglogloglog    










































log   








































log   
The equation (A-8) with equation (A-9) is  
(A-10)   ywww
y
c
wwP yyMyMLyLKyKy loglogloglog    















  )log,cov()log,cov()log,cov()log,cov(,cov iyiyiiMiyMiiLiyLiiKiyKiiyii ycwcwcwcc
y
n
   





































                                                          























































APPENDIX B: Derivation of Equation (12) 
 
The error term of equation (11) is  

























The second term of right equation is  
















































The equation (B-1) with equation (B-2) is  



























The b of equation (B-3) can be obtained as following equation. 
(B-4)       XXXXXXXb   11  





















       




















   
 The second term of second line at right side of equation (B-4) is  
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     
 
The third term of second line at right side of equation (B-4) is  
(B-6)             1 1
1 1
1 1n n
i i i i i i i
i i




           





















The first term of third line at right side of equation (B-4) is  































     




APPENDIX C: Auxiliary Equation  
 
The following equations are auxiliary equations for equation (15) 








































(C-5)  tiMtiLtiKtitiiKit yhcwhcwhcwhcy
c
w
hchcw logloglogloglog 524232221202 

 
(C-6)  tiMtiLtiKtitiiLit yhcwhcwhcwhcy
c
w
hchcw logloglogloglog 534333231303 

 
(C-7)  tiMtiLtiKtitiiMit yhcwhcwhcwhcy
c
w
hchcw logloglogloglog 544434241404 

 
(C-8)  tiMtiLtiKtitiiit yhcwhcwhcwhcy
c
w






rrs iMtiLtiKtitiixig loglogloglog 543210
2 

   














A. Parameters Value and Variance-Covariance Matrix used in Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
D-1. Variance-covariance matrix used for generating firm level data 
 
 










 m sKi sLi sMi ln y 
m 0.096     
sKi 0.037 0.270    
sLi -0.017 0.459 0.088   
sMi -0.005 0.066 0.005 0.033  
ln y 0.734 0.033 0.475 0.222 1.952 
Parameter Coefficien Parameter Coefficient 
βK 0.284 βYY 2.890 
βL 0.921 βYK 0.027 
βM 1.542 βYL -0.57 
βKK 0.178 βYM -1.14 
βLL 0.224 Θ 0.019 
βMM 0.291 α0 -3.12 
βKL -0.05 η 0.783 
βKM -0.04 α1 0.093 
βLM -0.08 α2 0.166 






IMPACT OF CAPTIVE SUPPLY ON SPOT PRICE IN THE U.S.  
CATTLE PROCUREMENT MARKET 
: A DYNAMIC MODELING APPROACH 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the impact of captive market supply on spot market price in the U.S. cattle 
procurement market, while considering dynamic interactions between captive and spot markets.  
Both conceptual analysis and empirical models explore advantages of dynamic models over static 
models by focusing on the temporal change in the ratio of captive purchase to packers’ total 
procurement and discount factor. Empirical models were estimated using the Kalman filter 
procedure with three alternative cost functions. Overall, dynamic estimation results found a 
negative relationship between captive market quantity and spot market prices. However, results of 
static model showed that the captive market quantity - spot market price relationship was 
sensitive to assumptions on captive supply and functional forms of cost function. Findings from 
our empirical analysis clearly suggest that dynamic models are more appropriate than static 






Recently captive cattle supplies through packer-owned cattle, forward contracts, and marketing 
agreements have greatly increased from 41% in 2007 to 60% in 2016 in the U.S. cattle 
procurement market (USDA-GIPSA). For many years, cattle producers have argued that packers’ 
captive cattle supplies harm the fed cattle industry by reducing spot prices. They claim that as 
beef packers procure the expanded proportion of cattle using captive supplies, their cattle demand 
from the spot market decreases and as a result, the spot price decreases. Prior studies suggest that 
when the extent of the reduced demand in the spot market is greater than its supply decrease, the 
spot price decreases (Azzam 1998; Love and Burton 1999; Schroeter and Azzam 1999; Zhang 
and Sexton 2000). Other studies claim that the relationship between captive supply and spot 
prices should be neutral, as curtailed packer demand in the spot market keeps balance with its 
diminished supply (U.S. General Accounting Office 1987; Hayenga and O’Brien 1991; USDA-
AMS 1996). For example, “If a 20% of the demand of fed cattle is removed, so is 20% of the 
supply, then, the net effect on the market is zero (USDA-AMS 1996, p.30). Overall, the 
relationship between captive supply and spot market prices has not been clearly determined in the 
literature (see Table 2.1).  
A major reason for this ambiguous result might be that most studies are based on static 
models that do not consider dynamic interactions between captive and spot supplies. However, in 
reality, beef packers are likely to determine the cattle procurement quantity from the captive 
market first and then fill their need from the spot market. Therefore, the optimal cattle 
procurement in spot market affected by the choice of captive market quantity. This dynamic 




Therefore, so-called “new empirical industrial organization (NEIO)” static framework used in 
earlier studies are not appropriate to simulate dynamic interactions between beef processors and 
rival firm’s reaction to each other’s quantity or price strategies (Dockner 1992).  
  There are two basic concepts to the dynamic market framework: strategic (repeated 
game) and fundamental setting (Perloff, Karp and Golan 2007). It is the strategic setting if firms 
think that its competitor will react to firm’s present actions in the future. If it is assumed that 
firms’ present activities change the stock variables that change future profit, then it is referred to 
fundamental setting. The stock variables can include goodwill, knowledge, and output. Corts 
(1999) points out that if the firm’s optimization process has dynamics, estimates of market power 
parameters are sensitive to the discount factor and the persistency of demand. In this case, static 
model is useful only if firms can modify their strategies instantaneously. However, firms cannot 
change input quantities that they process rapidly without cost, but also they need large 
modification costs in inventory and capital input or production (Karp and Perloff 1993a, 1993b; 
Slade 1995). Demand and supply shifts caused by captive supply are not explicit in static models 
as interactions between captive and spot markets continue through multi-periods. Therefore, the 
static model is difficult to capture the shifts of demand and supply in spot market induced by 
captive supply change (Azzam 1998; Katchova, Sheldon and Miranda 2005; Kutu and Sickles 
2012). 
  The interaction between captive market and spot market exist in cattle procurement and 
can be represented as ratio of captive market purchase. The ratio of captive market purchase 
increased constantly year by year from 42.9% in 2003 to 82.2% in 2019 (see Figure 2.1). The 
influence of captive supply to spot market should increase with the captive supply ratio. 
Therefore, the change in captive supply ratio and discount rate are used with the Kalman filter 
estimation procedure are used to reflect the dynamic interactions between captive and spot 




This study estimates the impact of captive supply on spot price in the U.S. cattle procurement 
market using a dynamic modelling approach. First, a conceptual illustration is provided to show 
that captive supply could either negatively or positively affect cash spot prices depending upon 
the discount factor and the proportion of packers’ beef procurement through captive supply 
market. Then, an empirical dynamic model is developed to incorporate multi-period interactions 
between captive and spot market supplies and estimated using the Kalman filter estimation 
procedure. The model considers the dynamic interactions between captive and spot supplies 
under assumptions of current both captive and spot supply change.  
 In the next section we provide a brief literature review on the issue of captive supply 
effect on the spot prices of the U.S. beef industry. The following section provides conceptual 
discussions on the importance of using dynamic model for the analysis of the relationship 
between captive supply and spot prices for the U.S. beef industry.  Then, derivation of empirical 
models and estimation results are discussed. Finally, the last section presents a brief summary of 











There are a few limited studies in the literature that discuss the impact of captive supply on spot 
prices in the U.S. cattle procurement market. The empirical estimation results of negative 
relationship is provided between captive supply and spot prices, but no causal link was examined 
in these studies (Hayenga and O’Brien 1990, Elam 1992, Schroeder et al 1993).  
Some studies develop structural approaches under non-competitive market assumption to 
find the causal relationship between captive supply and spot prices. Azzam (1998) uses an 
equilibrium displacement model and finds that captive supply causes a negative effect on cash 
market price. Burton (1999) argues that a superior downstream firm has an incentive to integrate 
upstream firms to increase the efficiency of its procurement market, which could affect price of 
open market price. Burton (1999) points out that the open market price can increase or decrease 
depending on how integration effect on the supply elasticity of raw material.  
Other studies use alternative approaches by focusing on trade attributes other than market 
conduct. Ward, Koontz and Schroeder (1998) examine the interdependent nature between pre-
committed captive supplies and fed cattle prices from the cash market. They found a negative 
relationship between captive supply and cash prices, and the magnitude was relatively large 
(between 5% and 35%). Zhang and Sexton (2000) consider high transportation cost as an 
important key factor in the cattle procurement market and conduct a spatial analysis using a  non-
cooperative game approach. The study suggests that the captive supply provides geographic 
buffers that reduce competition among packers but is less effective in reducing packers’ 
competition in markets where the spatial dimension is less important. Schroeter and Azzam 
(2004) claim that the delivery timing incentive is crucial point in explaining the captive supply-
cash market price relationship and find a negative relationship between quantities of captive 
deliveries and cash market prices. Zheng and Vukina (2009) test whether marketing arrangements 
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(one of captive supply tools) are one way of pork packers’ market power exertion in the spot 
market for live hogs. Although they find the statistically significant market power in the spot 
market of live hogs, they could not find the evidence that the marketing arrangements have been a 
source of pork packers’ market power exertion in the spot market.  
 Most previous studies on effects of captive supplies in the beef packing industry have 
employed either the reduce form model of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm or 
various econometric structural model associated with the NEIO. Both approaches have faced 
challenges representing dynamic interactions between captive supplies and spot market cattle 
prices. The empirical evidence of impacts of captive supplies on spot market cattle prices is not 































This section provides an analytical illustration for the importance of considering 
interactions between captive and spot markets with dynamic factors such as expectations of 
discount factor and ratio of captive market purchase procurement. This ratio has increased over 
time, and cattle procurement from spot market has been affected by captive market. The 
interaction between captive and spot markets, represented by the ratio of captive purchase, is an 
important component to reflect repeated games over time for the dynamic model. In addition, the 
firm’s decision making process of multi-period is represented by  a packer firm’s maximization 
problem of  the current profit and discounted expected future profit at each period. Therefore, the 
firm’s profit making decision process  depends on  the ratio of captive purchase and discount 
factor in the dynamic model. 
Following Adilov (2010), we assume that all processors can participate in captive market, 
but processors buy only a proportion of their cattle procurement from the captive supply market. 
The change in beef processor’s captive supply affects rival firm’s strategy in the spot market 
depending upon assumptions on interactions between captive and spot markets and dynamic 
factors: discount factor (  ) and the ratio of captive market purchase ( ) out of total cattle 
slaughtered in this framework.  
Consider the captive market demand  given by: 
(1)  , ,c t c tQ a P  , 
where ,c tQ  and ,c tP  are quantity and price in the captive market for week t, respectively. 
Then, the inverse residual demand in the spot market is: 
(2)    , , ,s t s t c tP a Q a P    , 
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where ,s tQ  and ,s tP  are quantity and price in the spot market for week t.   
The captive market price ( ,c tP ) usually ties the previous week’s spot market price 
(Schroeter and Azzam 2004). Therefore, we assume the relationship between captive and spot 
markets as , 1 ,c t s tP P  . A processor decides captive and spot supplies in current period t so that it 
can maximize its  discounted stream of profit in the optimization problem. In this case, the profit 
function of processor h for week t is: 
(3)      , , , , 1h beef h beef h ht t c t c t t s t s t tP P q P P q         . 
where beef
tP  is beef price,  is discount factor, 0 1  . 
Prices of captive and spot markets can be derived from the first order condition of equation (3).  
Then, assuming the steady state price solution, i.e.,
, ,s t c tP P for all t, we obtain 
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when γ =0 from equation (4), it is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium solution without considering 



































To see the effect of packers’ captive supply effect on the steady state cash price in the cattle 
procurement market, we calculate the price difference between spot price ( ,s tP ) and price under 
Cournot competition without considering captive supply (
cournotp ) as: 
(7)   
















If the equation (7) is negative, then spot price ( ,s tP )is less than price under Cournot competition 
(
cournotP ) and there exists the price-reducing effect due to the captive supply. Overall, P is 
negative as the ratio of captive market purchase increases under low discount factor. P becomes 
positive with the ratio of captive market purchase when the discount factor is high.  
 Specifically, the marginal effect of captive market participation ratio (γ) on packers’ 
price-reducing behavior can be calculated as: 
(8)   




2 1 2 1
2 3
beef
tp ap  
    
  

   
. 
The value of numerator of equation (8) determine the sign of equation (8). If the sign of 
p    is negative, the spot price will decrease as more beef processors participate in the captive 
market. If the sign of p    is positive, the spot price will increase as more beef processors 
participate in the captive market. The packer’s price reducing effect increases with the ratio of 
packers’ captive market purchase given discount factor when we account for the interaction 
between captive and spot markets.   
 Similarly, we can examine the effect of discount factor (β) on the price-reduction as: as 
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tp ap  
    
 
 
   
 
Equation (9) shows that the spot market price increases with discount factor, which 
indicates that if packers place more value on profits from captive supplies, the spot market price 
will increases.  
In Figures 2-1 and 2-2, Y and X show that levels of captive supply ratio (reflecting the 
interaction between captive and spot markets) and discount factor or the direction, either price-
decreasing or price-increasing, of captive supply on spot price. As the levels of captive supply 
ratio and discount factor change over time, the direction of captive supply effect should also 
change. Therefore, it is appropriate to estimate the empirical dynamic model that incorporates the 
market interactions as well as the discount factor using  
The Kalman filter procedure (Kalman 1960) estimate the dynamic model consecutively 
to incorporate packers’ dynamic decision making process for each time period.  The fundamental 
idea of Kalman filter is that using information about the dynamics of the state, the filter will 
produce forward and predict what the next state will be. The adjusting or update then involves 









DERIVATION OF EMPIRICAL DYNAMIC MODEL  
The conceptual illustration discussed in the previous section shows the importance of considering 
interactions between captive and spot markets, the extent of packers’ captive supply use for their 
cattle procurement, and packers’ evaluation of discount factor. This section derives an empirical 
model that can be applied to the U.S. beef procurement market data with multi-time interactions.   
 A few studies propose reality in decision making in conduct parameter approach with 
incorporation dynamics (Puller 2007, 2009; Kutlu and Sickles 2011). Puller’s two studies focus 
on fundamental dynamic setting, while Kutlu and Sickles (2011) focus on firm’s strategic 
behavior in repeated games.  Firms notice the demand and cost shock before they make  their 
decisions at the starting point of each cycle. Rival firms adjust their output decisions and control 
profits strategically.  
Dynamic models are appropriate when considerable adjustment cost terms in prices or 
capital accumulation as firm’s dynamic behaviors are affected by present and future’s demand 
and supply (Karp and Perloff 1993a, 1993b; Slade 1995; Katchova, Sheldon and Miranda 2005). 
Therefore, the variable contained dynamic attributes is main difference between static model and 
dynamic model. If these variables are omitted, estimated parameters are likely to be biased . 
Firms have information about  demand and cost shocks before they make choices at the beginning 
of each time. Next, the firms choose their strategical choice and these decisions are publicized to 
others. Then, the oligopoly member react the shocks and modify their quantity decisions 
strategically. Firms’ future profit after the breaking collusion can be decreased by other firms’ 
retaliatory reaction even though firm wants to deviate from collusion currently. In other words, 
continuity of collusion is up to benefit from breaking the collusion and expected future profit. The 
firm’s deviation is prevented by this process when the firms have high motivation to deviate. This 
process can be written as: 
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      
     , 
where *
tQ is quantity under collusion, 
i
ts is market share of firm i in time t, tQ is total quantity, 
, ,,t c t s tS ds ds    represents the state of the market for week t; dsc,t and dss,t are demand shock 
variable in captive and spot market, ,i b
t is the best response profit, 
,i r
t is the profit for the 
retaliation period, ,*i
t is the profit when firms are collusion,  is discount factor. 
The generalized Leontief cost function of beef packing firm i for week t is written as: 




i j k c t s t
j k
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where 
iq is firm i’s cattle sum of quantity procured in captive market and spot market, j, k =2, 
which means captive and spot market,  Pc,t, Ps,t is cattle price in captive and spot market in week t, 
respectively. The inverse supply function of live cattle in captive market for week t is written as: 
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 , Psub is price of substitute of beef, md represents dummy variables for 
seasonality. 
 The profit function of firm i for week t is given as: 
(13)      
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tP is beef price.  
From the first order condition with respect to ,
i
c tq  for the equation (13), we have: 
(14)    
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 represents the relationship between captive supply change and 
spot market price change, , ,
i i i
t c t s tq q q   is firm i’s sum of cattle procurement in captive and spot 
market.  
As mentioned above, 
t means how much spot market price change if captive supply 
change and treat as a parameter to be estimated. Assuming 
i
t t  to estimate industry level, 
equation (14) can be summarized over N firms and divided by N firms both side. Then, equation 
(14) for the U.S beef industry becomes: 
(15)       
0.5
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 , is total cattle procurement in captive and spot market in beef industry.   
From equation (15), the marginal effect of captive market margin with respect to cattle supply 
from spot market,  Qs,t, can be derived as: 
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Equation (16)shows that the additional margin that will be generated by increasing product 
sales by one unit of spot market quantity. The market conduct parameter (θt) and N do not affect 
the sign as the θt has positive value between zero and one and N is also positive value. However, 
it is not enough interpretation of λt as relation between captive quantity and spot prices because 
marginc,t variable is construct as difference between beef price and captive market cattle price 
( , ,
beef
c t t c tmargin P P  ) as equation (14). And we already find that the ratio of packers’ captive 
market purchase has important role to relation between spot price and captive quantity in equation 
(8). Therefore, the equation (15) need to have the ratio of packers’ captive market purchase and 
we can divide the equation (15) with total cattle procurement quantity (Qt) or captive market 
quantity (Qc,t). Then, the equation (15) divided by total cattle procurement quantity (Qt) is 
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  which  
means the ratio of packers’ spot market purchase and has inverse relationship with 
,c t , ratio of 
packers’ spot market purchase as 
, ,1s t c t   .  Then, the marginal effect of captive market 
margin with respect to ratio of spot market purchase can be obtained as: 



















Equation (18) is likely to have negative sign as spot market quantity has inverse 
relationship with captive market quantity. 
Equation (15) divided by captive cattle procurement quantity ( ,c tQ ) is the relative 
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which means the relative ratio of packers’ spot market purchase to captive market.  Then, the 
marginal effect of captive market margin with respect to relative ratio of spot market purchase is: 















Extending equation (15) with dynamic consideration,  is written as:  
(21)      
0.5
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, 2 , , , , , , , ,2 ,
t
c t c t t s t c c c t c s c t s t ss s t tmargin P Q P P P P
N

            
where *
t is dynamic factor and represent the compatibility constraint in equation (10).Firm's 
dynamic actions are affected by present demand, future demand, current cost and future cost 
(Borenstein and Shephard 1996). The continuity of a collusion rely on the gain from deviation 
and future loss caused by other firm's revenge. Kutlu and Sickles (2012) show that demand shock 
can be modelled by industry market output divided by expected industry market output for the 





t is evaluate the shadow cost of collusion and mean the incentive compatibility 
constraint in equation (10). 
The dynamic factor, 
*
t , is modelled as a linear function of captive market demand shock 
( ,c tds ) and spot market demand shock as: 
(22)   
*
1 2 , 3 ,t c t s tds ds      , 
The demand shocks are defined as: 
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. 
Equation (21) has similar form of traditional NEIO model except dynamic attributed term, 
*
t . The firm plays static game if the 
*
t  is zero for each time period in the equation. In contrast to 
previous case, the firms play a repeated game if the dynamic attributed term is not zero and can make 
omitted variable bias if *
t is ignored. The industry conduct is perfect competition if t =0 and 
*
t =0 
and industry conduct is perfect collusion (monopoly) if 
t =1(Kutlu and Sickles 2012).  
The proportion model, Equation (17), and its relative proportion model, Equation (19), with 
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The beef packing industry has procured cattle from both non-cash and cash markets, and 
the ratio of cattle procurement from non-cash market has increased continuously. The market 
share of non-cash market and cash market from the cattle procurement market are 82.2% and 
17.8%, respectively,  in 2019. Cattle procurement from non-cash market is through  marketing 
agreement,  forward contract, packer-owned cattle Marketing agreement and forward contract has 
74.9% and 7.3% of total cattle procurement. The cattle price of marketing agreements are 
calculated by formulas and these formulas have equations about yield grade, quality grade and 
carcass weight range. The base price is decided by cash market prices paid the week before 
delivery of the cattle procured in marketing agreement. For the specific, the base price in five of 
nine formula is calculated by a week prior delivery price, which was reported in USDA 
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS).  In the rest four of nine formula, base price is decided at 
average price level by the packers during the week of delivery of the marketing agreement cattle. 
The most part of delivery takes usually one week, however small part can takes more days than 
one weeks3. Therefore the price of marketing agreement can be tied up to one or two week prior 
spot market price.  
The forward contract cattle is also one of cattle procurement method on non-cash market. The 
packer ask feeder delivering cattle of exact heads at designated month in forward contract. When 
the packers decide the fixed number of cattle at specific delivery week finally, they ask feeder 
delivering and time lag happens to arrange the transportation4. The forward market price is decided 
by cash sale price, based on the previously agreed basis bid (Ward, Koontz and Schoeder 1996).  
As indicated earlier, 
t in equations (24) and (25) represents s the relationship between 
captive supply change and spot market price change and its component, the spot and captive 
                                                          
3 .The average delivery date is 6.98 and standard derivation is 3.28 (Schroeter and Azzam 2004).  
4. The mean days of from scheduling date to slaughter date is 11.88 days and standard derivation is 7.98  




market price are affected by their previous prices as mentioned above. Therefore, 
t is 
constructed as unobserved time-varying state and is generated by AR(1). The equation (21) with 
(22) can be written as follows and this is base model. 
(26)   
0.5
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(27)   






    , 
tE     , t t    , 1t  is disturbance term of observation 
equation and 
1t ~N(0, Hε), η1t is  disturbance term of state equation, η1t ~N(0, Hη) 
  
The static form of equation (21) do not have dynamic factor and can be written as: 
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The dynamic model equation (26) and static model equation (28) have some differences. 
Firstly, the dynamic factors are considered the dynamic behavior affected by present and future 
demand. Secondly, The equation sets are estimated by Kalman filter algorithm to reflect the 
dynamic interaction. If the *
t is not significant ( 1 2 3 0     ), then the dynamic factors do 
not reflect the dynamic interactions and vice versa.  
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    , 
tE     , t t    , 2t is disturbance term of observation 
equation and 
2t ~N(0, Hε), η2t is  disturbance term of state equation. 
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Another cost function forms, trans-log cost function and quadratic cost function are applied 
to consider the sensitivity of model. The equation of these cost functions are showed in Appendix 
A and B. The generalized Leontief cost function, trans-log cost function, quadratic cost function 
with base model, proportion model, and relative proportion model, total 9 types are estimated and 









Cattle procurement quantity in captive and spot market, price of captive and spot market, 
wholesale price are from Livestock Marketing Information Center and these datasets are consist 
weekly and from 1st week of 2003 to 52th week of 2019 (Livestock Monitor of LMIC). 
Labor, Capital, and material input prices of the beef packing industry are from Industry 
Productivity and Costs Database of Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), United States Department 
of Labor (USDL). Beef price is from the ERS of the USDA and income is Per Capita GDP of the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Grain Inspection, Packer and Stockyards 
Administration (GIPSA), and the National Agricultural Service (NASS).  
The summary statistics of data are displayed in table 2.2. The average cattle procurement 
of captive market per week is 170 million lbs. and has 59.4% of total cattle procurement. The 
average spot market procurement is 117 million pound , which is 40.6% of total cattle 
procurement for   the study period.  
The average cattle price of captive market is $173.2/cwt and standard deviation is 
$36.2/cwt. On the contrary, the average spot cattle price is $172.2/cwt and standard deviation is 
$36.6/cwt. The whole sale price of beef is $180.8/cwt and its standard deviation is $36.5/cwt. The 




ESTIMATION AND RESULTS  
Equations (18) and (19) are estimated using the Kalman filter procedure. The Kalman filter model 
typically include  two component equations: 1) observation equation and 2) state transition 
equation. The relationship between Yt and αt is modeled in the observation equation, and the 
relationship between αt and αt+1 is represented in the state transition model as: 
(33)  , ~ 0,t t t tY N H     
(34)  1 , ~ 0,t t t tu u N Q     
(35)  1 1 1~ ,N a P , 
where εt and ut is noise term of observation equation and state equation and independent 
mutually, α1 is initial state value and its mean and variance are a1 and P1. 
Consider 1 1t t ta E Y     , which means that 1ta  is the prediction of 1t   conditional on 
Yt at time t and 1 1art t tP v Y     , is the conditional variance of 1t  . The one step ahead forecast 
error, vt is calculated as vt=yt-at and its variance, var( )t tv F is one of component to calculate the 
Kalman gain.  Given at and Pt , at+1 and Pt+1 can be calculated as: 
(36) 
1 ,t t t ta a K v    






 and defined as Kalman gain, Q is process noise covariance matrix. Then, t can 
be predicted by 1tY  , and ta (prediction value of t ) can be updated by using additional 




ta at time t ( t tt ta E Y    ). Therefore, tK term in the equation (36) is optimal weight 
between ta and tv . The new observation is more weighted if tP (conditional variance of t ) has 
larger value. As same way, new observation is not reliable and have smaller weight if 
tF (variance 
of forecasting error) has larger value. The 
tP value can be updated by using equation (37) and 
identical logic can be applied in equation (37). The system parameters and initial values can be 
estimated by maximum likelihood estimation method (Kutlu and Sickles, 2011). 
Three alternative cost functions, generalized Leontief, trans-log and quadratic cost 
functions are considered with the base model, proportion model and relative proportion model. 
The base model is concerning spot market quantity, proportion model is concerning ratio of spot 
market purchase to total quantity, and relative proportion model is concerning ratio of spot 
market purchase to captive quantity. 
Estimation results with generalized Leontief cost function are reported in Table 2.3. 
Estimated λ is negative and statistically significant  in all dynamic models. Estimates of λ is -
0.0007 and significant at 1% level in base model. Estimates of λ from proportion and relative 
proportion models are -0.0005 and -0.0001, respectively, which are statistically significant at 1% 
level.  The statistically significant negative values of λ indicates that the spot market price will 
decrease as captive supply increases, which is consistent  with findings from some of previous 
studies (Schroeder et al. 1993; Azzam 1998; Love and Burton 1999; Schroeter and Azzam 1999; 
Zhang and Sexton 2000; Schroeter and Azzam 2003; Schroeter and Azzam 2004; Wohlgenant 
2010). If the captive market quantity increase one unit, the spot price decrease 7cents/cwt. As the 
same way, if the captive market purchase ratio increase 1%, the spot price decrease 5cents/cwt. If 




Estimates of dynamic factor terms, μ2 and μ3, are significant at 10% and 1% level, 
respectively, for the base model. Both μ2 and μ3 are significant at 1% level from the proportion 
model and relative proportion model.  Statistically significant dynamic factors shows the 
importance of using dynamic models over static models. The omitted variables bias should exist 
if static model is used instead of dynamic model. Estimates of δs are 0.6670, 1.1730 and 1.7077 
in each model and significant at 1% level. Estimates of βc,s from base model is insignificant. 
However, estimates of βc,s from proportion and relative proportion models are 1.7292 and -
0.0046, respectively, which are statistically significant at 1% level. Estimates of βs,s from base 
model is insignificant. However, estimates of βs,s from proportion and relative proportion models 
are -2.0247 and 0.6271, respectively, which are statistically significant at 1% level. 
Estimates from static models are also reported in Table 2.3 to compare static results to the 
estimation results from dynamic results. Overall, estimates of λ from  static models show positive 
values. From the static base model,  λ is 0.0002 and statistically significant at 1% level. .  The 
estimates are 0.0003 and 0.1124 and they are both significant at 1% level, which is opposite of 
outcomes from dynamic models outcomes. Some of previous results also show positive estimates 
or negative but insignificant. Positive relations are estimated by Hayenga and O'brien(1990), 
Schroeder et al (1993), Ward, Koontz and Schroeder (1998). Negative but insignificant relations 
are estimated by Elam(1992), Schroeter and Azzam(2004), Wohlgenant (2010). Estimates of δs 
from static models show 3.5092, 3.1333 and 16,660.1 and all significant at 1% level. Estimates of 
βc,ss are -2.2255, -1.8868 and -8,390.4 and all significant at 1% level. Estimates of βs,ss are 
2.6405, 2.2969 and 0.4382 and all significant at 1% level. 
Estimation results with trans-log cost function are presented in Table 2.4.  Estimated λs 
are negative and statically significant value from all dynamic models. Estimate of λ is -0.0008 
and significant at 1% level in base model. λs are -0.0009 and -0.0002 and all significant at 1% 
and 5% level in proportion and relative proportion models . If the captive market quantity 
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increase one unit, the spot price decrease 8cents/cwt. As the same way, if the captive market 
purchase ratio increase 1%, the spot price decrease 9cents/cwt. If the relative ratio of captive 
market purchase increase 1%, the spot price decrease 2cents/cwt  
Estimates of μ2 and μ3 are significant at 1% in all dynamic models. Estimates of δ is -
4.0700 and significant at 1% level in base model. Estimates of δs from proportion and relative 
proportion models are -2.5000 and -2.4778, respectively, which are statistically significant at 5% 
level. Estimates of βq is -4.44 and significant at 10% level in base model. Estimates of βq from 
proportion and relative proportion models are 10.0000 and 8.5445, respectively, which are 
statistically significant at 1% level.  Estimates of βq,c is 1.5700 and significant at 5% level in base 
model. However, Estimates of βq,c from proportion model is insignificant and βq,c from relative 
proportion models are 0.9982 and significant at 10% level. Estimates of βq,ss are -2.0900, -1.5000 
and -1.9277 and all significant at 1% level. Estimates of βq,q is 0.9710 and significant at 1% level 
in base model. However, Estimates of βq,q from proportion and relative proportion models are 
insignificant.  
However, estimates of λ in static model are negative from the base model but positive 
from other two models. The estimate of λ is -0.0003 and significant at 1% level in static base 
model, but has statistically significant positive values at 0.0002 in static proportion and relative 
proportion models. Estimates of δs in static model are 2.9211, 5.6802 and 3.8509 and all 
significant at 1% level. Estimates of βq in static model are 6.7263, 10.2887 and 4.3955 and all 
significant at 1% level. Estimates of βq,c is 0.4468 and significant at 1% level in base model. 
Estimates of βq,c from proportion and relative proportion models are 0.0002 respectively, which 
are statistically significant at 10% level. Estimates of βq,ss are 0.4913, -0.0015 and -0.0015 and all 




The estimation result of quadratic cost function approach is given in Table 2.5.  Estimate 
of λs are -0.0009 and significant at 1% level in dynamic base and proportion models. However, λ 
has positive value at 0.0004 and significant at 1% in dynamic relative proportion model. If the 
captive market quantity increase one unit, the spot price decrease 9cents/cwt in base model. As 
the same way, if the captive market purchase ratio increase 1%, the spot price decrease 
9cents/cwt in proportion model. The μ2 and μ3 terms are significant at 1% in all dynamic models. 
Estimates of μ2 are -24.8, -0.0001 and -0.0002 and all significant at 1% level. Estimates of μ3 are 
16.000, 0.0001 and -0.0001 and all significant at 1% level. Estimates of δs are 0.5260, 0.5120 and 
2.1912 and all significant at 1% level. Estimates of βq,qs are 0.0007, 182.0 and 0.0000 and all 
significant at 1% level. Estimates of βs,qs are insignificant in base and proportion model. 
Estimates of βs,q from relative proportion models is -0.9108 which are statistically significant at 
1% level.    
The parameter estimates of λ in static model shows negative values. Estimates of λ are -
0.0007, -0.0006, -0.0002 and significant at 1% level in static base, proportion, relative proportion 
models. Estimates of δs are 0.3883, 0.0008 and 0.8147 and all significant at 1% level. Estimates 
of βq,qs are 0.0009, 0.4845 and 0005 and all significant at 1% level. Estimates of βs,qs are 0.4318, 
0.4022 and 0.4318 and all significant at 1% level. 
Most of dynamic estimation results found a negative relationship between captive market 
quantity and spot market prices. However, results of static model show that signs of λ estimates 
are sensitive to assumptions on captive supply and functional forms of cost function. Findings 
from our empirical analysis clearly suggests that dynamic models are more appropriate than static 






The objective of this study is to estimate the impact of captive supply on spot price in the 
U.S. cattle procurement market using a dynamic modelling approach. First, conceptual model 
showed how the packers’ price-reducing behavior through captive supply was sensitive to 
assumptions on dynamic factors such as expectations of discount factor and ratio of captive 
market purchase to spot market procurement. The conceptual model showed that captive supply 
could either negatively or positively affect cash spot prices depending upon the discount factor 
and the proportion of packers’ beef procurement through captive supply market. Then, a dynamic 
model was developed to incorporate multi-period interactions between captive and spot market 
supplies 
Three types of purchase ratio information were considered in the dynamic estimation 
model: the base model with captive supply quantity, the proportion model with the ratio of 
captive purchase to total procurement, and the relative proportion model with the ratio of captive 
purchase to spot quantity. Additionally, three different types of cost functions: generalized 
Leontief, trans-log, and quadratic cost function forms were used for the sensitivity analysis.  
Dynamic models were estimated using the Kalman filter procedure iteratively to address the 
dynamic interactions between captive and spot supplies.  
Most of dynamic estimation results found a negative relationship between captive market 
quantity and spot market prices. However, results of static model showed that the captive market 
quantity - spot market price relationship was sensitive to assumptions on captive supply and 
functional forms of cost function. Findings from our empirical analysis clearly suggests that 
dynamic models are more appropriate than static models in examining the impact of captive 
supply on spot price in the cattle procurement market. When the dynamic model is used, the 
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Table 2.1. Previous Studies on Relationship between Captive Supply and Spot Market Price 




Relationship between captive supply  
and spot market price 
1 Ward (1990)   Beef processing I 
2 Hayenga and O’Brien (1990)   Beef processing 
P (Colorado) 
N (Texas) 
3 Elam (1992) Monthly, State 1988-91 Beef processing 
N (national data, Kansas, Colorado) 
I (Nebraska, Texas) 
4 Schroeder et al. (1993) 
Transaction, 
Local 
1990 Beef processing 
N 
P (some packer and time periods) 
5 Azzam (1998)   Beef processing N 
6 
Ward, Koontz and Schroeder 
(1998) 
Transaction, U.S. 1992-93 Beef processing 
P (forward contract) 
N (marketing agreement and packer-fed) 
7 Love and Burton (1999)   Beef processing N 
8 Schroeter and Azzam (1999) 
Transaction, 
Regional 
1995-96 Beef processing N 
9 Zhang and Sexton (2000)   Beef processing N 
10 Schroeter and Azzam (2003) 
Transaction, 
Regional 
1995-96 Beef processing N (small magnitude) 
11 Schroeter and Azzam (2004) 
Transaction, 
Regional 
1995-96 Beef processing 
N (marketing agreement) 
I (forward contract) 
12 Wohlgenant (2010) 
Transaction, 
Weekly 
2001-05 Pork processing 
N 
I (reduced form model) 
Notes: ‘P‘ means positive relation, ‘N‘ means positive relation and ‘I‘ means statistically insignificant relationship between captive supply and 
spot market price. 
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Table 2.2. Summary Statistics of Data  
 Unit Mean St.Dev Maximum Minimum Median 
Captive Market 
Cattle Procurement 
1,000lbs 170,431 45,207 293,100 21,417 173,120 
Spot Market Cattle 
Procurement  
1,000lbs 116,664 47,727 265,239 26,682 109,060 
Captive Market 
Cattle Price  
$/cwt 173.2 36.2 266.9 114.7 170.6 
Spot Market  
Cattle Price 
$/cwt 172.2 36.6 270.8 117.3 169.3 
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Table 2.3. Estimates from Dynamic and Static Models with Generalized Leontief Cost Function  
















δ 0.6670*** 1.1730*** 1.7077*** 3.5092*** 3.1333*** 16660.1*** 
λ  -0.0007*** -0.0005*** -0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.1124*** 
βc,s -0.4830       1.7292*** -0.0046*** -2.2255*** -1.8868*** -8390.4*** 
βs,s 0.2810       -2.0247*** 0.6271*** 2.6405*** 2.2969*** 0.4382*** 
μ1 321.00*** 0.0008*** 0.0004***       
μ2 -12.500*     -0.0001*** -0.0001***       
μ3 35.000*** -0.0000*** 0.0001***       
Note: It is assumed that θ=0.1, N=20 for simplicity (Azzam 1997). ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ indicate 





Table 2.4. Estimates from Dynamic and Static Models with Trans-log Cost Function  
















δ -4.0700*** -2.5000**   -2.4778**   2.9211*** 5.6802*** 3.8509*** 
λ  -0.0008*** -0.0009*** -0.0002**   -0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
βq -4.4400*     10.0000*** 8.5445*** 6.7263*** 10.2887*** 4.3955*** 
βq,c 1.5700**   0.6190       0.9982*     0.4468*** 0.0002*     0.0002*     
βq,s -2.0900*** -1.5000*** -1.9277*** 0.4913*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** 
βq,q 0.9710*** -0.1640       0.0216       -0.8543*** 0.5029*** 0.1767*** 
μ1 240.00*** 0.0007*** 0.0004***       
μ2 -22.900*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***       
μ3 15.000*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***       
Note: It is assumed that θ=0.1, N=20 for simplicity (Azzam 1997). ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ indicate 




Table 2.5. Estimates from Dynamic and Static Models with Quadratic Cost Function  
















δ 0.5260*** 0.5120*** 2.1912*** 0.3883*** 0.0008*** 0.8147*** 
λ -0.0009*** -0.0009*** 0.0004*** -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0002*** 
βq,q 0.0007*** 182.00*** 0.0000*** 0.0009*** 0.4845*** 0.0005*** 
βs,q -0.1700       -0.1480       -0.9108*** 0.4318*** 0.4022*** 0.4318*** 
μ1 176.000*** 0.0006*** -0.0001             
μ2 -24.800*** -0.0001*** -0.0002***       
μ3 16.000*** 0.0001*** -0.0001***       
Note: It is assumed that θ=0.1, N=20 for simplicity (Azzam 1997). ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ indicate 
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APPENDIX A: Trans-log cost function approach. 
Trans-log cost function form is given as:  
(A-1) 
2 2 2 2
2
0 , , , ,
1 1 1 1
1
log log log log log log log (log )
2
i j j t jk j t k t j i j t q i qq i
j j k j
c P P P q P q q     
   
        , 
where 
iq is firm i’s total cattle procurement and  j, k are captive or spot market. 
The price equation with marginal cost function of (A-1) can be written as: 
(A-2)    , 2 , , , ,log log 2 logtc t c t t s t q qc c t qs s t qq t
t
c
margin P Q P P Q
N Q

           . 
Then, the base model is: 
(A-3)   *, , , , , ,log log 2 logt tc t t s t t c t s t q qc c t qs s t qq t
c
margin Q P Q P P Q
N N Q
 






  . 
The proportion model is: 
(A-4)  , *, , ,2 log log 2 log
c tPR t t
c t t t t t q qc c t qs s t qq t
t t
P c
margin P P Q
N Q N Q
 
                 . 
The relative proportion model is: 
(A-5)  , *, , ,
, ,
log log 2 log
c tR R Rt t
c t t t t t q qc c t qs s t qq t
c t t c t
P c
margin P P Q
N Q N Q Q
 
                 . 
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APPENDIX B: Quadratic cost function approach. 
The quadratic cost function form is given as:  
(B-1)   
2
, , , ,
1
2
i j j t q i jk j t k t qq i jq j t i
j j k j
c P q P P q P q    
 
     
 
    
where 
iq is firm i’s sum of cattle procured in captive market and spot market, j, k is captive or 
spot market. 
The price equation with marginal cost function of (B-1) can be written as: 
(B-2)    , 2 , , , ,tc t c t t s t qq cq c t sq s tmargin P Q Q P P
N

         . 
The base model is: 
(B-3)   *, , 2 , , , ,t t tc t t s t c t s t qq t cq c t sq s t tmargin Q P Q Q P P
N N N
  
             . 




c t s tPR t t




N Q N Q
 






    . 





s tR R rt t t
c t t t t c t t qq sq t
c t c t
PQ
margin P
N N Q Q
 
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